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ABSTRACT

The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 provides an abbreviated FDA approval
pathway for biosimilars. The passage of this biosimilar legislation is a positive step toward retaining
a robust biotechnology industry in the United States while also protecting innovators. The Act's
increased FDA exclusivity is welcome, but FDA exclusivity alone is insufficient to encourage and
protect innovation and investment in biosimilars. Instead, the exclusivity provided by a patent term,
together with the ability to adjust this term to compensate an applicant for U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and FDA delays, is necessary to ensure development of highly specialized and
resource-intensive biologics. This article suggests a closer correlation of the patent term with FDA
market approval. The author argues that while it may be difficult to strike a perfect balance, all will
benefit when innovator biologics have strong patent protection coupled with long FDA exclusivity
periods.
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THE IMPACT OF THE BIOSIMILARS PROVISION OF THE
HEALTH CARE REFORM BILL ON INNOVATION INVESTMENTS
KATHERINE N. ADDISON*

I. INTRODUCTION

For the first time, the United States has a statutory abbreviated approval
pathway for biosimilars to enter the market. This pathway, called the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (the "Act") 1 was signed by President Obama
in March 2010. The abbreviated approval pathway provided for by the Act is timely
as traditionally small-molecule pharmaceutical companies devote more resources to
biologics development. 2 The biopharmaceutical industry is now worth nearly $600
billion for manufacturers internationally and the United States constitutes almost
half of that market. 3 Despite economic downturn, the industry has still progressed,
and was expected to increase by five percent in 2010.4 Medical market analysts
predict that the market for pharmaceuticals will be almost $800 billion by 2015,
representing more than a six percent growth in five years. 5
In 2010, it was estimated that fifty percent of all new drugs approved by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") would be biologics, and sales of biologics
were expected to exceed $60 billion by the end of the year. 6 Biosimilar producers can
C Katherine N. Addison 2011. Ms. Addison is an intellectual property and patent attorney
with Fulwider Patton LLP of Los Angeles, CA. She specializes in patent prosecution for clients of all
sizes in the medical device and clean technology industries but welcomes clients with all varieties of
intellectual property needs. The content and opinions presented herein are attributed to the
individual author alone and not her past, present, or future employers or clients. The author thanks
Kristina Swanson for her assistance in authoring and researching the article.
1The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 98 Stat. 1585, (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A § 18001 (West 2011)). The Biosimilars provision is included in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act. Id. The individual mandate included in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (health care law), that requires Americans to have commercial insurance, has

been challenged four times since it was enacted for being unconstitutional. Kevin Sack, Federal
Judge Rules That Health Law Violates Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, at Al. Twice it has
been declared constitutional, and twice it has been declared unconstitutional. Id. The most recent
holding by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that the individual
mandate of the health care law was not only unconstitutional, but also "inextricably bound" to the
rest of the bill, rendering the health care law in its entirety was unconstitutional. Florida v. U.S.
Dept. of Health & Human Service 2011 WL 285683, at *33-34 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). The
previous three conflicting holdings coupled with this most recent holding clear a path to take the
issue 2to the Supreme Court. Sack, supra note 1.
Emerging Health Care Issues: Follow-on Biologic Drug Competition FED. TRADE COMM'N, i
(June 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/PO83901biologicsreport.pdf.
3 Bruce Carlson, Biologics Pipeline Set to Replenish Coffers, GENETIC ENG'G & BIOTECH. NEWS
(Aug.
1,
2010),
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/biologics-pipeline-set-to-replenishcoffers/3366.
4
1d.

6 See Press Release, Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Bipartisan Group of Members Introduces
"Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-Saving Medicines Act" (Mar. 11, 2009),
http://www.henrywaxman.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=115183;
see Henry
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take advantage of this economic opportunity. Accordingly, there arose a need for
regulation to prevent the public from unscrupulous, opportunistic copycats that
attempt to free ride off the goodwill of more reputable establishments. 7

A. Definition of Biologics
"Biologics" are medicines created through a combination of living organisms. 8
Most pharmaceuticals, comprised of small molecules, are much less complex than
biologics. 9 Biologics are commonly referred to as protein-based drugs in contrast to
small-molecule drugs. 10 Recombinant therapeutic proteins are complicated products
made up of a variety of organisms including bacteria, yeast, mammal cells and
enzymes." The characteristics of recombinant drugs are heavily influenced by the
production process. 1 2 The concentration of proteins, temperature of production,
amino acid arrangement, and molecular weight all affect the final product. 13
The development of biologics has provided new avenues to treat multiple
diseases including HIV/AIDS, cancers, arthritis, hemophilia, and many others. 1 4 The
development of an in vitro production system has allowed for recombinant human
genetic material to be used to create new drugs. 15 Further, the development of
monoclonal antibody technology, combined with knowledge acquired in the Human
Genome Project, has paved the way for target medicines. 1 6 Both gene therapy and
cell therapy have emerged as new methods of attacking diseases. 17
Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-On Biologics: How Will It Evolve?, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS
1291, 1291 (2006) (explaining that biologics are growing at twice the rate of prescription drugs).
7See generally Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, Market Structure and the Timing of Technology
Adoption with Network Externalities, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 225, 230 (1998) (explaining that when
many entities enter a market, as is the case for emerging technologies, prices are competitively low);
see FTC, supra note 2, at 1.
8Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons From HatchWaxman and an Early Evaluation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 34
NoVA L. REV. 629, 650 (2010).
9 Id.
10 Id.

11Benjamin Leader et al., Protein Therapeutics:
Classification. 7 NATURE REV. 21, 21 (2008).

A Summary and Pharmacological

12 See id.

13Wen-Ching Chan et al., Learning to Predict Expression Efficacy of Vectors in Recombinant
Protein Production, BIOMED CENT. (Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.biomedcentral.com/14712105/11/S1/S21.
14 See Hearing on the Potential Need for Measurement Standards to Facilitate the Research
and Development of Biologic Drugs, House Sci. & Tech. Subcomm. on Tech. & Innovation, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of Anthony Mire-Sluis, Exec. Dir. of Global Prod. Quality at Amgen);
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 418 BIOTECHNOLOGY MEDICINES IN TESTING PROMISE TO
BOLSTER THE ARSENAL AGAINST DISEASE (2006), available at http://www.allhealth.org/
briefingmaterials/PhRMA418BiotechMeds-415.pdf; Arachu Castro & Michael Westerhaus, How Do
Intellectual Property Law and International Trade Agreements Affect Access to Antiretroviral
Therapy?, 3 PLOS MED. 1230, 1232 (2006).
15 See, e.g., Robert Boehm, Bioproduction of Therapeutic Proteins in the 21st Century and the
Role of Plants and Plant Cells as Production Platforms, 1102 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 121-34 (2007).
16Id.
17 See id.
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B. Differences Between Biologics and Small-Molecule Drugs
Biologics are not classified in a scientific manner the same as small-molecule
drugs because they are much larger and more complex. 18 It is not possible to create a
"generic" biologic that is identical to the innovator biologic. 19 Because of the
complexity of the production process, biosimilars are difficult to replicate exactly. 20 A
biologics producer would not have access to the original process, formulas, or
equipment, all which affect the outcome. 21 Some have gone as far to say the process
cannot be replicated exactly. 22 Notably, these changes can have serious ramifications
on the safety of the drug. 23 The differences in production of two similar biologics can
trigger very different immunogenic responses. 24 Even a small temperature change
during manufacturing can result in a change in immunology. 25 Therefore, unlike
simple or common chemical drugs, a change in biologics, including biosimilars, can
have serious consequences and create health concerns. 26
Biosimilars are not generic drugs. 27 Generic drugs are copies of innovative
drugs, are similar in composition and safety, and have met the same standards of the
FDA. 28 Alternatively, conventional pharmaceuticals are composed of small molecules
through chemical reactions. 29 It is possible to make an exact copy of small-molecule
drugs, even if the drug is branded and patent-protected. 30 For example, both
Tylenol® and a generic version of the drug are made up of the same atoms in the
same structure. 31 Biologics, however, are far more complex. 32
For example,
Herceptin@ is a popular anti-cancer biologic comprised of about 25,000 atoms. This
is more than a thousand times the number of atoms in Tylenol®. 33 It follows then,
18See Biosimilars, MASSBIO, http://www.massbio.org/public policy/federalissues/biosimilars
(last visited Mar. 25, 2011); see also Comm'r Pamela Jones Harbour, Remarks at the ABA Sections
of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law Meeting: The Competitive Implications of Generic
Biologics 3, 5 (June 14, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/070614genbio.pdf (explaining
that biologics are known as large molecules and are hard to classify chemically compared to smallmolecule drugs).
19Sally Pipes, A Primer for Follow-on Biologics, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (June 6, 2008),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/06/a1primer for followon biologic.html; see Harbour,
supra note 18, at 5.
20

See Harbour supra note 18, at 6.

21See id.
22
23

Id.
Id.

24

Id.

25

Basant G. Sharma, Manufacturing Challenges for Biosimilars-The Process Defines the

Product, 13 EUR. J. HOSP. PHARMACISTS PRACS. 54, 55 (2007).
26 See
Understanding Generic Drugs, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/
Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/default.htm
(last updated

Mar. 25, 2011); Mary Shedden, A Dose of Safety, TAMPA TRIB., May 31, 2008, at 14 (explaining that

generic drugs must be therapeutically interchangeable).
27 Barbara Mounho et al., Global Regulatory Standards for the Approval of Biosimilars, 65
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 819, 825 (2010).
28 See
29 See

301dg
31
32

Id.
Id.

33Id.

UnderstandingGeneric Drugs, supra note 26.
Pipes, supra note 19.
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that it would be a much more complicated manufacturing task to try and consistently
arrange 25,000 atoms.
Additionally, the manufacturing process for biologics is far more complicated.
Most biologics must be grown in living organisms, and many involve modified DNA.34
In fact, "[e]ach molecule of a biologic may have a slightly different structural
pattern-even if it has the same chemical formula and is made according to the exact
same process." 35 For larger molecules it is more difficult to control the resulting
structural pattern. 36
A biosimilar, unlike generic drugs, "is a product that is similar to, but not the
same as, the innovator drug." 37 Because of the complexity involved, the FDA and
foreign regulators have determined that the approval pathway for generic drugs
would not be sufficient for complex biologics. 38
Even small differences in
biotechnology drugs have been known to lead to uncertain outcomes in effectiveness
and safety, and also to create health hazards such as immunogenicity (causing an
immune response). 39
The FDA prohibits generic drug makers, from obtaining data on drugs targeted
for copying until five years after they have been approved. 40 In Europe, this "data

34Id.
35 Id.

36 See Simon D. Roger & Ashraf Mikhail, Biosimilars: Opportunity or Cause for Concern?, 10 J.
PHARMACY PHARM. SCI. 405, 405 (May 18, 2007).

37 Taking the Pulse: FDA to Hold Hearings on Biosimilars, BIOTECH Now (Oct. 6, 2010, 2:16
PM), http://biotech-now.org/section/health/2010/10/06/taking-pulse-fda-hold-hearings-biosimilars.
38 See generally Richard G. Frank, Regulation of Follow-on Biologics, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED.
841 (2007) (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman framework for small-molecule drugs, which creates
a regulatory pathway for generic competition, does not apply to biopharmaceuticals, and arguing
that Congress must create a new regulatory regime for biopharmaceuticals if it wishes to foster
generic competition in the field); Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399d
(2006). The FDA regulates how biologics enter the market under the PHSA and the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). Id. Two organizations previously shared the regulatory
responsibility including pre-market and post-market evaluations. See The Law of Biologic Medicine:

Hearing before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004). These organizations are the
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research ("CBER"), which handles, for example, gene therapy
and vaccines; and the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER"), which handles, for
example, monoclonal antibodies.
See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER)
Responsibilities
Questions
and
Answers,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CBER/ucm133072.htm (last updated Apr. 30, 2009).
Prior to the Act, when a biologic entered the market, the innovator company was required to file an
Investigation New Drug ("IND") application. Id.; see also About the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/default.htm (last updated Nov.
29, 2010). The approval process involves preclinical development, clinical development, approval,
and marketing oversight. Development & Approval Process (Drugs), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugsl
developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm (last updated Oct. 27, 2010). Section 351 of the Public
Health Service Act requires the innovator company to file a Biologics License Application ("BLA").
The FDA has approved some biologics, such as insulin, however, through the traditional process for
small molecule drugs provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act.
39 Daniel E. Troy, The Difference with Biologics: The Scientific, Legal, and Regulatory
Challenges of any Follow-On Biologics Scheme, BIO INDUS. ORG., 7 (Apr. 25, 2007),
http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/WhitePaper.pdf.
40 See Pipes, supra note 19.
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exclusivity" period is six or ten years, depending on the country. 41 The recently
passed legislation for biosimilars in the United States provides manufacturers of new
biologics products twelve years of exclusivity. 42 Interpretation as to whether the
twelve years of exclusivity means data exclusivity or marketing exclusivity is
currently under debate, 43 but at the present time the FDA seems to characterize it as
the latter. 44 In any case, the four-year wait-to-file period provided by the recently
passed legislation may operate as a data exclusivity period. At a minimum it should
prevent biosimilar producers from making use of innovator data following approval of
the innovator's biologics license application ("BLA").

C. HistoricalBackground

1. Europe Procedure
Compared with the European regulation of biologic pharmaceuticals, which
includes already adapted procedures for approving secondary versions of a drug, the
United States is behind in the process. 45 The approval procedure is predicated on a
showing of comparability of a similar product to an already approved product. 46
Europe adopted a case-by-case analysis for applications of new biosimilars. 47
This standard for creating a duplicate of an original drug offers little insight into the
amount of testing-how little or how much relative to the original testing-that may
be required in order to gain approval.4 8 Ultimately, the European Medicines Agency
("EMEA") will determine the scrutiny of the testing for a secondary product,with
some data on efficacy and safety considered for market approval. 49 The EMEA has

41 Eur. Generic Med. Ass'n, Data Exclusivity, EGA GENERICS, http://www.egagenerics.com/gendataex.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
42Tracy L. Muller & Timothy J. Shea, Jr, New U.S. Law Establishes Long Awaited Abbreviated
Approval
Pathway
for
Biosimilars,
NAT'L
L.
REV.
(Apr.
12,
2010),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-us-law-establishes-long-awaited-abbreviated-approvalpathway-biosimilars. The exclusivity term is extendable to twelve and a half years when pediatric
studies are undertaken. Id.
43 Emily K. Strunk, Debate Over Exclusivity in Biologics Provision of PPACA Heats Up,
HEALTH REFORM RESOURCE CTR., http://aghealthreform.com/2011/02/14/debate-over-exclusivity-inbiologics-provision-of-ppaca-heats-up (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
44 See Approval Pathway for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological Products, 75 Fed. Reg.
61,497, 61,498, 61,500 (Oct. 5, 2010).
45 Linda Park, The Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, REG. SCI. - UNIV. S. CAL., 19,
http://regulatory.usc.edu/Articles/GenericPharmaceuticallndustry.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2011)
(article adapted and edited by Daya Perkins, Roger Clemens & France Richmond).
46See Comm. for Med. Prods. for Human Use, Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal
Products, EUR. MEDICATION AGENCY (Oct. 5, 2005), http://www.ema.europa.eu/pdfs/human/
biosimilar/043704en.pdf.
47Mark Senak, What Can be Learned from Europe's Regulation of Biogenerics?, BIOTECH 360
http://www.biotech360.com/biotechArticleDisplay.jsp?biotechArticleld= 100016 (last visited Mar. 25,
2011).

49 Id.; see Grabowski, supra note 6, at 1297.

[10:553 2011]

Biosimilars Provision of the Health Care Reform Bill
Impact on Innovation Investments

559

approved two human growth hormone products, Sandoz's Omnitrope and
Biopartners' Valtropin@, which are similar to Somatropin. 50
Europe appears to be more receptive to approving biosimilars, although recent
positive recommendations and approvals have been focused around the red-bloodcell-stimulating drug erythropoietin. 51 This drug is the main component of Johnson
& Johnson's Eprex®, which is marketed by Amgen and Johnson & Johnson as
Epogen@ in the United States. 52 It is not surprising that second-comer "generic"
drug-makers want a piece of the action, provided that the drug currently costs
patients $10,000 or more per year in the United States. 53
The year 2007 marked the beginning of the biosimilars era in Europe. 54 In
August 2007, Novartis received marketing approval for its epoetin alfa equivalent to
treat anemia, commonly associated with chronic renal failure and chemotherapy."
In October 2007, Hospira received a positive recommendation from the Committee
for Medicinal Products for Human Use ("CHMP") for its follow-on version of epoetin
zeta, which it named Retacrit®, and in December 2007 the European Commission
(which usually follows the CHMP's recommendation) gave marketing approval. 56
Hospira began marketing the drug in Europe in 2008 (initially in Germany and
Austria in January and February and in the United Kingdom in May). 57

2. United States Development, Legislative History
Prior to 2010, there was not a clear pathway for biosimilar approval in the
United States.5 8 Although the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of
1984 ("Hatch-Waxman Act"), 59 and its corresponding regulations provide a complex
set of rules to govern the approval and market-entry of generic drugs, the Act's
50See Europe Clears Second Biosimilar Product, PHARMA TIMES ONLINE (May 5, 2006),
http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/06-05-05/Europe-clears-second-biosimilar-product.aspx.
51See Melissa J. Heinrichs & Gary M. Owens, Where Generics and Biologics Meet, AM. HEALTH
& DRUG BENEFITS, 23 (June 2008), http://www.ahdbonline.com/article/where-generics-and-biologicsmeet.
52Andrew Pollack, Amgen and Johnson & Johnson Recall Anemia Drugs, N.Y. TIMES BLOG
(Sept. 24, 2010, 12:34 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/amgen-and-johnsonjohnson-recall-anemia-drugs/.
53 Bruce Jaspen, Hospira Drug Processes in Europe, CHI. TRIB. ONLINE (Oct. 25, 2007),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-thu-notebook_1025oct25,0,233584.story.
54 See, e.g., Media Release, Sandoz, Sandoz Receives European Commission Approval for
Biosimilar epoetin alfa (Aug. 31, 2007), http://hugin.info/134323/R/1150279/220459.pdf.
55 Id.
56 Comm. for Medicinal Prods. for Human Use, October 2007 Plenary Meeting Monthly Report,
EMEA (Oct. 25, 2007), http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/enGB/document_1ibrary/Committee
meeting report/2009/10/WC500006238.pdf.
57 See Transcript of Hospira, Inc., Q1 2008 Earnings Call (May 7, 2008),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/76200-hospira-ine-q1-2008-earnings-call-transcript.
58 See Anurag Rathore, Biosimilars, 64 PDA J. PHARM. SCI. & TECH. 289, 289 (2010).
59 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). Congress enacted
the Hatch-Waxman Act as a compromise between competing public policy interests. The legislation
sought to create an incentive for innovator companies to develop and market new small molecule
drugs to counter the cost regulatory requirements of the USPTO and the FDA. It also sought to
create incentives for generic drug companies to introduce generic versions of drugs.
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Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") provisions specifically exclude
biologics. 60 Congress likely did not include biologics within the scope of the HatchWaxman Act's ANDA provisions because only a few biotechnology-derived drugs
existed when the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984. Additionally, perhaps
Congress appreciated the difficulty in verifying bioequivalence in biologically derived
drugs given the extant technology. 61 Evolving technology has significantly improved
the ability to produce and test bioequivalence for biologically derived drugs. 62
Henry A. Waxman's new bill, Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-Saving
Medicine Act, is designed "to provide for the licensing of biosimilar and biogeneric
products." 63 The introduction of this bill was one of many other similar attempts to
create a system for biosimilar approval. 64 The numerous bill proposals, like
Representative Waxman's, created a sense of urgency to address the biosimilars
issue. 65 Consequently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act contains
sections that permit approval of biosimilars. 66
Only a few biosimilars have been authorized in the United States under the
ANDA procedures, such as Menotropins (in January 1997) and Enoxaparin (in July
2010), and eight others. 67 The FDA has permitted regulatory approval of biological
60See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,951 (Apr. 28,
1992) (comments to the new rules stating that "[t]hese procedures are inapplicable to antibiotics
(which are approved under section 507 of the act) and biological drug products licensed under 42
U.S.C. 262").
61Id.; see also John A. Little, Jr., Taking from Trailblazers: Learning from Those Who Have
Gone Before When Approving Biosimilars, 44 GA. L. REV. 1097, 1118 (2010).
62 See Comm. for Medicinal Prods. for Human Use, Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal
Products Containing Monoclonal Antibodies, EUR. MED. AGENCY (Nov.
18, 2010),
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/enGB/documentlibrary/Scientific-guideline/2010/11/WC500099361
.pdf.
63H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. (2009).
64See, e.g., Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. (2008); Patient Protection and
Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R. 1956, 110th Cong. (2007); Access to Life-Saving
Medicines Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007).
65Amber W. Aagaard, et al., Review, Approval, and Marketing of Biosimilars in the United
States,

BIOPROCESS

INT'L,

12

(Dec.

2010),

http://www.bioprocessintl.com/multimedia/archive/00111/BPIA_100811ARO2_0111127a.pdf.
66 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-7003, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of title 28, 29, 35, and 42 U.S.C.) (enacting Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong.). H.R. 3590 provides for the
licensing of "biosimilar" and "interchangeable" biological products. See id. § 7002(a)(2). A follow-on
product will be considered "biosimilar" if it is "highly similar" to the original product and "there are
no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the [original] product in
terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the product." Id. § 7002(b)(3). A product will be
considered "interchangeable" if it is biosimilar, it "can be expected to produce the same clinical
result ... in any given patient," and the risk of switching the patient one or more times between the
original product and the biological product can be expected to be not significantly greater, in terms
of safety or diminished effectiveness, than the risk of continuing to use the original product without
such switching. Id. § 7002(a)(2). Approved interchangeable products "may be substituted for the
[original] product without the intervention of the health care provider who prescribed the [original]
product." Id. § 7002(b)(3); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul
Bill, With a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, Al9.
67 See Krista H. Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 685-86 (2010); Aagard, supra
note 65 (explaining the FDA has approved 10 follow in biologics through December 2010).
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products under § 505(b)(2), as new drug applications ("NDA"). 68 This kind of
application relies on the FDA's prior approval of a drug's safety, requiring only a
showing of similarity to the already approved drug. 69 The law requires the new
applicant to show that any difference between the second drug and the originally
approved drug does not change the safety or effectiveness of the second drug. 70
Additionally, a § 505(b)(2) applicant must certify and explain that the application
does not infringe on an already existing patent listed in the "Orange Book."71 The
original inventor, however, could bring a lawsuit under 35 U.S.C. § 271, which could
end up in a thirty-month delay of approval while the suit is carried out. 72 Products
marketed under § 505(b)(2) applications, can receive an "AB" Orange Book rating,
meaning they are formulaically and therapeutically similar. 73
In 2004, the acting commissioner of the FDA explained there was not sufficient
legal basis upon which to approve biosimilars, which were based on biologics
originally approved under the Public Health Service Act. 74 Since 2004, the FDA has
held public meetings on follow-on protein products and Congress has held hearings
on the issues. 75 On March 17, 2009, the Pathway for Biosimilars Act was introduced
68See Guidance for Industry: Applications Covered by Section 505(b)(2), FDA (1999),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm7
9345.pdf; Little, supra note 61, at 1108-09.
69Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Immitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation
Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics in the United States, 35
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 569-70 (2008).
70See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.54 (2010) ("Procedure for Submission of an Application Requiring
Investigations for Approval of a New Indication for, or Other Change from, a Listed Drug").
71See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006); Letter from Osmotica to FDA (July 24, 2009),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2009-P-0356-0001; Orange Book: Approved
Drug
Products
with
Therapeutic
Equivalence
Evaluations,
FDA,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (last updated Dec. 21, 2010).
72See Cynthia Luchetti, Market Exclusivity Strategies for Pharmaceuticals,23 PHARM. MED.
77, 81, 83 (2009).
73See Mukesh Kumar & Hemant Jethwani, The 505(b)(2) Drug Development Pathway: When
and How to Take Advantage of a Unique American Regulatory Pathway, FDA (Apr. 2010),
http://www.amarexcro.com/articles/docs/RAPSFocus_505b2_Apr2010.pdf.

74See Dr. Lester Crawford, Acting Comm'r FDA, Statement before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, The Law of Biologic Medicine (June 23, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Testimony/ucm113745.htm; see also Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt. 427 F. Supp. 2d 29, 40 (D.D.C. 2006)
(granting the biosimilar producer's summary judgment regarding egregious delay in FDA reviewing
an ANDA under 505(b)(2)). In 2003, Sandoz submitted an ANDA to the FDA under section 505(b)(2)
for a growth hormone that was a biosimilar. Id. at 31. The active ingredient in the product was the
same as Pfizers Inc.'s Genitropin, a recombinant growth hormone that had been on the market for
fifteen years prior to Sandoz's ANDA filing. Id. The ANDA was based upon the FDA approval of
Genitropin and Sandoz claimed the products were indistinguishable. Id. Following pressure from
Pfizer to reject the application, the FDA deferred evaluation of the application due to the complexity
and nature of the biologic. Id. Over a year later, Sandoz took action against the FDA due to the
long delay in evaluating the application. Id. The court granted Sandoz's motion for summary
judgment and the FDA subsequently approved Sandoz's FOB. Id. The FDA cautioned in its
approval that they did not intend to approve all FOBs using the Hatch-Waxman small molecule
pathway to marketability of generics and explained they did not have the authority to approve
future FOBs. Id.
TSSee, e.g., Follow-On Protein Products: Regulatory and Scientific Issues Related to
Developing, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/ucm085854.htm
(last
updated June 22, 2010); Janet Woodcock, Deputy Comm'r, FDA, Statement before the SubComm. on
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in the House. 76 Then, on March 23, 2010, President Obama allowed approval of
biosimilars when he signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which
created the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act ("BPCIA").77

II. THE NEW LEGISLATION

A. Terms
As expected, because of the complex nature of biologics compared to traditional
chemically synthesized drugs, the new legislation is quite rigorous in its demands on
biosimilars or "subsection (k) applicants" ("Applicants"). 78
In fact, the BPCIA
requires Applicants to submit analytical, animal, and clinical studies. 79 Analytical
studies must demonstrate that the biological product is highly similar to the
referenced product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive
components. 80 Animal studies must include an assessment of toxicity.81 Clinical
studies must include an assessment of immunogenicity and pharmacokinetics or
pharmacodynamics sufficient to demonstrate safety, purity, and potency in one or
more appropriate conditions of use for which the reference product is licensed and
intended to be used and for which licensure is sought for the biosimilar product. 82
Additionally, Applicants must disclose evidence to support the same mechanism
or mechanisms, to the extent known, of action as the pioneer biologic or reference
product. 83
Applicants must also demonstrate that the biosimilar product is
appropriate for the same conditions of use previously approved for the reference
product and that the biosimilar product has the same route of administration, dosage
form, and strength as the reference product. 84 Applicants can only rely on one
previously approved reference product per subsection (k) follow-on application. 85
Thus, an Applicant cannot rely on two or more reference products in attempt to gain
approval for a combination follow-on product. 86 Finally, Applicants must consent to
an inspection of the facility in which the biosimilar is made. 87

Health, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (May 2, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Testimony/ucml54017.htm.
76See H.R. 1548 Pathway for Biosimilars Act, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/
bill/111-hl548/show (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
77See H.R. 3590:
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hi11-3590 (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
78 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(l)(1)(A) (West 2011).
79 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(bb).
80 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(aa).
81 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(bb)
82 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(cc).
83 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II).
84 Id.§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(III)-(IV).
85 Id. § 262(k)(5)(A).
86 Id.

87 Id.§ 262(k)(3)(B).

[10:553 2011]

Biosimilars Provision of the Health Care Reform Bill
Impact on Innovation Investments

563

The BPCIA distinguishes between biosimilarity and interchangeability. 88 As a
result, biosimilars that are also interchangeable must satisfy additional criteria.89
Biosimilar is defined as: "(A) that the biological product is highly similar to the
reference product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive
components; and (B) there are no clinically meaningful differences between the
biological product and the reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and
potency of the product." 90 Interchangeable means that the "biological product may be
substituted for the reference product without the intervention of the healthcare
provider who prescribed the reference product." 91 Thus, in order to find a biosimilar
interchangeable, the FDA must establish that, for a drug administered multiple
times, substitution of an Applicant's product for an approved pioneer biologic does
not increase risks associated with treatment or decrease efficacy. 92 A major
advantage of a finding of interchangeability is that an exclusivity period of one year,
from first commercial marketing, or other relevant period is granted against
subsequent biosimilars relying on the same reference product.93

B. Procedure
The BPCIA grants an exclusivity period of twelve years to the reference product
or pioneer biologic for which a biologics license application has been previously
approved. 94 Thus, the FDA will not approve a biosimilar for an Applicant effective
until twelve years after the date of approval of the reference product on which it
relies. 95 Additionally, the Applicant must wait until four years after the approval of
the reference product before filing the subsection (k) application alleging
biosimilarity and interchangeability. 96 These wait-to-file and exclusivity periods do
not apply when the same manufacturer that made the reference product creates a
supplemental or new indication, route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage
form, delivery system, delivery device, or strength.97
Biosimilar applications under subsection (k) are treated as confidential by the
FDA and only made available to reference product sponsors, patent owners, the legal
counsel of both groups, and select others. 98 In fact, it is the Applicant's duty to
provide a copy of the application to the reference product sponsor, along with any
other information that describes the process or processes used to manufacture the
Id. § 262(i)(2)-(3).
89 See id. § 262(k)(4).
90 Id. § 262(i)(2).
91Id. § 262(i)(3).
92See Judith Johnson, FDA Regulation of Follow-On Biologics, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., (Apr.
http://www.primaryimmune.org/advocacy center/pdfs/health care reform!
26,
2010)
BiosimilarsCongressional Research ServiceReport.pdf.
93 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(6). Contra 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006) (providing 180 days of exclusivity to
the first ANDA filer).
94 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(A).
95 Id.
96Id. § 262(k)(7)(B). This term extends to four and a half years if pediatric studies are
undertaken.
97 Id. § 262(k)(7)(C).
98 Id. § 262(1).
88
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follow-on biological product that is the subject of the application. 9 9 The applicant
must do this within twenty days after receiving notification that the subsection (k)
application has been accepted for review. 100 Then, within sixty days of receipt of the
application, the reference product sponsor has the opportunity to notify the Applicant
of a list of potentially infringed patents that it owns or licenses along with those
patents, if any, it is willing to license to the Applicant.101 The Applicant has sixty
days to respond to the reference product sponsor's list of patents with either a
statement that it does not intend to begin commercial marketing of the biological
product before the patent expires; or a detailed statement that describes, on a claimby-claim basis, the factual and legal basis of the Applicant's opinion that such patent
is invalid, unenforceable or not infringed by the commercial marketing of the
Applicant's subsection (k) biological product. 1 02 The reference product sponsor and
Applicant then have fifteen days to reach an agreement as to which patents will be
infringed. 1 03 If no agreement is reached, then the reference product sponsor has
thirty days to bring a patent infringement action. 104 The Applicant has an
affirmative duty to notify the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services of any subsequent infringement action.105
While the recent legislation mandated an abbreviated approval pathway for
biologics, the details of this pathway remain to be tested with a first case. 1 06 In order
to implement the new legislation, the FDA created the Biosimilar Implementation
Committee. 107 The committee will hold public meetings and solicit commentary from
stakeholders, experts, innovators, patients, and the public on the various issues with
the new approval process. 108 Although the Committee has hosted several meetings
already and requested public comments, it is estimated that it will take several years
for the FDA to fully implement a procedure. 109 FDA spokesperson Karen Mahoney
has not confirmed any hearings or provided any insight as to when generic biologics

9 Id. § 262(l)(2).
100Id.

101Id. § 262(l)(3).

§ 262(l)(3)(B).
§ 262(l)(4)(B).
104 Id. § 262(l)(6)(B).
105See id. § 262(l)(2)-(6).
102 Id.
103 Id.

106See Michael P. Dougherty, The New Follow-On-Biologics Law: A Section by Section
Analysis of the Patent Legislation Provisions in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 231, 245 (2010).
107Implementation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, FDA,

http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ucm2l5089.htm
(last
updated Mar. 10, 2011).
108 Id.
109See Janet Woodcock, Deputy Comm'r for Operations, U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human
Services, Statement on Heparin Testimony before Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Apr. 29, 2008),
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2008/05/t20080429a.html;
Maxwell R. Morgan, Regulation of
Innovation Under Follow-On Biologics Legislation: FDA Exclusivity as an Efficient Incentive
Mechanism, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 93, 100 (2010); FDA Holds Public Hearing on
Biosimilar Pathway,
GENERICS
AND
BIOSIMILARS
INITIATIVE
(Oct.
29,
2010),
http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/News/FDA-holds-public-hearing-on-biosimilars-pathway.
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may be approved. 110 In fact, she has stated, "There are so many factors that will
impact when biosimilar products will enter the market, [t]herefore, it is not
reasonable to speculate."111 A candid statement from Congressman Michael C.
Burgess is consistent with this sentiment: "This is a difficult concept, and it does
involve a lot of moving parts, and a lot of different contingencies. For your average
member of Congress-or even for your member of Congress with some background in
health-it does become difficult to think about these things." 11 2

C. Beneficiaries
There are numerous beneficiaries of the new legislation including the innovators
(reference product sponsors), the biosimilar manufacturers (subsection (k)
applicants), and members of the general public who purchase biologics.
The
following section outlines the ways in which each of these distinct beneficiary groups
is affected by a biosimilar approval pathway.

1. Innovators
Reference product sponsors are rewarded for their efforts to bring products to
market with twelve years of FDA exclusivity. 1 1 3 Even in the absence of enforceable
patents to cover the pioneer products, the BPCIA provides an independent avenue to
achieve exclusivity for a limited period of time. 1 1 4 Due to uncertainty and a long wait
period in obtaining a patent, this guaranteed exclusivity provides investors with
greater security that the research and development costs incurred in bringing a
product to market and obtaining FDA approval will be recouped. 115 When investors
have greater security and sense less risk, they are more likely to invest and to invest
larger amounts. 1 1 6 With more investment, then development, and a move from
academia to the lab to the marketplace, is likely for a greater number of potentially
life-saving biological products. 117

110 See Denise Napoli, Generic Biologics' Safety Questioned as Approval Process Stalls, SKIN &
ALLERGY NEWS (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.skinandallergynews.com/index.php?id=372&cHash=
071010&txttnews[tt news]=16835.
111 Id.
112

Id

113 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7) (West 2011).
114 See Morgan, supra note 109, at 98.
115 Emily K. Strunk, Debate Over Exclusivity in Biologics Provision of PPACA Heats Up,
HEALTH REFORM RESOURCE CTR., http://aghealthreform.com/20 11/02/14/debate-over-exclusivity-inbiologics-provision-of-ppaca-heats-up (last visited Mar. 25, 2011); see Hilary Greene, Patent Pooling

Behind the Veil of Uncertainty: Antitrust, Competition Policy, and the Vaccine Industry, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 1397, 1431-51 (2010) (discussing the economic impact of patent exclusivity in pharmaceutical
production).
116 See Ted Buckley et al., Data Exclusivity Period Length and Federal Government Savings

from Enactment of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007 (Working Paper, Jan.
26, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1333263.
117 See id.
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2. Biosimilar Producers
Under the BPCIA, Applicants benefit because less money is required to obtain
product approval and enter the marketplace than before. 118 Applicants have to wait
four years after a reference product is approved before filing their biosimilar
application and twelve years either: (i) to actually use the data in the reference
product application to get their biosimilar product approved; or (ii) to market their
approved biosimilar, depending on how the exclusivity period granted by the Act is
ultimately construed. 119 Before passage of the BPCIA there was no pathway for
obtaining approval of a complex biologic (biotech or biopharmaceutical) product
without receiving enough funding to undertake lengthy clinical trials. 120 Now, with
the opportunity to rely on some of the research investments and findings of others
(reference product sponsors) after a fixed time period, the BPCIA allows a greater
number of biologics manufacturers to enter the marketplace by reducing the barriers
to entry. 1 21 This enables these same manufacturers to use their resources on product
improvements and other future problems. 122

3. Public Consumers
With reduced barriers to entry, and more companies in the marketplace
producing similar or interchangeable biologic products, consumers benefit through
reduced prices. 1 23 These consumers include patients in need of biologic therapeutics,
their employers, health insurance providers, and taxpayers in general who fund
public health programs including Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the
poor. 1 24 Reduced prices, caused by greater competition, benefit each of these groups
by reducing the amount spent on healthcare. 1 25 Money spent in any one place has an
opportunity cost of not being spent in another place; reducing money spent on
healthcare allows cost saving benefits to be realized. 1 26 Furthermore, spending the
saved money in other areas could stimulate the U.S. economy. 1 27 To employers: less
expensive healthcare plans, due to decreased biologic treatment costs, translates to
higher profit, which allows the companies to hire more employees. 128
118See Henry Grabowksi et al, The Market for Follow-On Biologics: How Will It Evolve?, 25
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1291, 1293 (2006).
119 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(A)-(B) (West 2011).

120See Morgan, supra note 109, at 96; see also Grabowksi supra note 118, at 1292.
121See Grabowski, supra note 118, at 1293.
122See Strunk, supra note 115.
123Richard Epstein, OVERDOSE:
How EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION

STIFLES

PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 96 (2006).

124See Napoli, supra note 110.
125See id.; Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 4 (July 2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf.
126Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending In an International Context, 23
HEALTH AFFAIRS 10, 18-19 (2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/23/3/10.full.html.
2

1 71d4

128Cf. Improving Health Care, supra note 125 (discussing the substantial burden and stress
that increased costs of healthcare have imposed on health care providers and the employment-based
health insurance system).
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III. DATA EXCLUSIVITY VS. MARKET EXCLUSIVITY
In a recently published article, Maxwell Morgan highlights the distinction
between data exclusivity and market exclusivity and advocates for the latter. 129 As
mentioned, the type of exclusivity intended under the BPCIA is currently under
debate. It was initially thought that the BPCIA would provide the former, data
exclusivity. Data exclusivity would prevent biosimilar companies from substituting
an innovator's data to obtain FDA approval for a full twelve years. 1 30 Conversely,
market exclusivity would prevent biosimilar producers from having their applications
approved and marketing their products for twelve years from the date of approval of
the pioneer biologic. 1 31 In a sense, market exclusivity is stronger because it would
prevent generic firms from entering the market, even if they were willing to replicate
the original trials. Although data exclusivity does not extend this right, it could be
potentially more powerful (assuming generic producers do not want to or cannot
incur the costs of generating their own data) because it delays the date on which
generic producers can submit their subsection (k) applications. 132 Applications not
submitted until after twelve years of data exclusivity will not be simultaneously
approved and accordingly, the effective exclusivity period would be longer than
twelve years. As Morgan notes, an example of market exclusivity is provided with
the Orphan Drug Act, which induces investment into research on rare diseases with
small patient populations by assuring pioneer investors the entire small patient
population market for a term. 133

IV. INTERPLAY OF PATENT PROTECTION AND FDA EXCLUSIVITY

A. Overlap
With both patent protections providing the right to exclude others from copying
along with automatic FDA exclusivity upon obtaining approval, there is likely to be
some overlap in exclusivity terms. 134 The terms, however, serve different needs and
are awarded for satisfying different objectives.
Patent exclusivity is granted for disclosing a product that is useful, novel, and
not obvious in view of what has come before it. 135 In order to obtain a patent, an
applicant must present a detailed and thorough written description sufficient to
enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention, including disclosure
of the best mode for practicing the invention. 1 36 This detailed information is
129See Morgan, supra note 109, at 98-99.

Id. at 98.
Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). Market exclusivity to prevent others from coming within
the scope of the patent claims (infringing) although others can still enter the market with similar
products that fall outside or design around the scope of the claims.
135 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
136 Id. § 112.
130
131
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published eighteen months from the earliest priority date claimed although the
patent may not be granted until five or more years after the earliest application is
filed. 1 37 The delay for a patent is so long due to the backlog at the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office ("PTO"). 1 38 This backlog results in a long wait time before the
applicant even receives an initial substantive response from a patent examiner at the
PTO, followed by a period of communication in which the applicant amends the
claims and/or presents arguments to the PTO as to why the invention is patentable
in view of cited reference art. Most patents are not granted in the first office action
but require a period of negotiating the scope and language of the claims. 139
In contrast, information provided in an FDA application is not immediately or
promptly available to the general public but may be held in confidence for a longer
time period or indefinitely. 1 40 Additionally, the information that required for FDA
approval may prove safety and effectiveness of a product but it does not necessarily
enable others to make and use the product. 1 41 Furthermore, a product that is safe
and effective, though useful, is not necessarily novel or non-obvious and thus may not
meet the threshold for patentability. 142
Awarding exclusivity for a patent serves the need for public disclosure of
information in order to spread knowledge and spur innovation. 1 43 Patent exclusivity
also satisfies the objective of providing a reward to truly significant leaps in
technology. 144 The patentable material must not only be new or novel but also not
obvious in view of the referenced art. 1 45 To determine whether the claimed subject
matter of a patent application is not obvious in view of what has come before it the
PTO and courts consider the perspective of a "person having ordinary skill in the
art." 1 46 The question is whether it would have been obvious to this person. 147 Tests
have been developed through the case law and incorporated into the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedures ("MPEP"), a reference guide for patent examiners and
applicants, to help determine whether something is obvious or not. 148 One test is the
"teaching-suggestion-motivation" ("TSM") test which serves to prevent against
hindsight bias. 149 Even assuming the inventive subject matter is a combination of
known elements, it may still be patentable if there was no teaching, suggestion, or
motivation existing (at the time the application was filed or the invention was
137 Id.

§ 122(b)(1).

138 See,

e.g., Patent Inventory Statistics-FY09, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/appbacklog.jsp (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
139 See First Office Action Pendency (months), DATA VISUALIZATION CTR. (Feb. 2011),
http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml;
General Information Concerning Patents,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Jan. 2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general.
140 See, e.g., Dennis S. Fernandez & James T. Huie, Strategic Balancing of Patent and FDA
Approval Processes to Maximize Market Exclusivity, 7 ASIAN PAC. BIOTECH. NEWS 998, 999 (2003).
141 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.05 (8th ed. 8th Rev., July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP].
142 See, e.g., Astrazeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1029, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
143 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 150-51 (1989).
144 See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51.
145 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2006).
146 See id. §103(a).
4
1 71d4
148 MPEP, supra note 141, § 2141.
149 In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir.

2006).
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conceived). 150 Another well-known inquiry to elucidate the meaning of "obvious" is
consideration of factors ("The Graham Factors") outlined by the U. S. Supreme Court
in Graham v. John Deere Co. 151 The Court held that obviousness should be
determined by looking at: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of
ordinary skill in the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the
prior art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. 1 52 Factors that show
"objective evidence of nonobviousness" are: (1) commercial success; (2) long-felt but
unsolved needs; and (3) failure of others. 153
For example, commercial success assists to prove that the invention provides
something truly valuable to the marketplace for which there are not ready
alternatives. 154 Long-felt but unsolved need supports the theory that the invention
which solves the needs is not obvious or it would have been solved earlier. 155
Evidence of the failure of others trying to address the same problem with which the
invention is concerned suggests the solution was not readily ascertainable or obvious
to people of ordinary skill in the art.1 56 Long-felt but unsolved needs and failed
attempts of others can also lead to teaching away from addressing the problem with
certain methods. 15 7 If an invention has nonetheless managed to resolve the problem
with methods that other people of ordinary skill in the art advise against then there
is a greater chance that the invention is not obvious because contemporary
authorities were pointing in a different direction to find the solution. 15 8 Nonpatentable products can have economic value too, but patentable products are likely
to have greater value because they must pass the nonobvious inquiry. 159 Products
that are not obvious are less likely to have readily available alternatives or
substitutes and are more likely to offer something original to society. 1 60 A biologic or
pharmaceutical product can be safe and effective, and gain FDA approval without
being nonobvious-without being patentable-or, in other words, while being
obvious. 1 61 It makes sense to provide a greater reward in the form of a patent term
longer than the FDA exclusivity period, for products that are patentable and
nonobvious because they are less likely to have readily available alternatives and
substitutes and are more likely to require greater resources to conceive. 1 62 To take
on greater risk, investors require greater reward. 163 Previously unserved groups of
150 See KSR Int'l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 405-06, 415, 419 (2007).

383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
Id
153 Id
154Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966).
158 See In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
159 See Assessing the Value of a Patent: Things to Bear in Mind, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
151
152

http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/valuing patents.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
160 Lauren J. Stiroh et al., Market Power in Technology Markets, in ANTITRUST/INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CLAIMS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARKETS: LITIGATING AND ADVISING (ALI-ABA Course of
Study) (1999), available at WL, SD72 ALI-ABA 61.
161 Astrazeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1029, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
162 See Fernandez, supra note 140.
163 See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, The Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 123-24 (2004).

[10:553 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

570

consumers benefit from new products. 1 64 A nonobvious product without alternatives
or substitutes is more likely to serve these consumers or to address a previously
unresolved, ignored, or marginalized class of problems. 1 65
Granting FDA exclusivity for new market-approved products serves the need of
stimulating the translation of biochemical theories and lab experiments to safe and
effective marketable products. 166 FDA exclusivity satisfies the objective of providing
a reward for investing in the lengthy and expensive clinical trials necessary to
establish safety and effectiveness. 167
The patent term may overlap the FDA exclusivity term at the beginning of the
exclusivity term if the patent was filed and is granted early. 1 68 The patent term may
also overlap the FDA exclusivity term at the end of the exclusivity term if the patent
was filed late or is granted late. 1 69 If the patent application is filed and the patent is
granted late then a patent term at the end of the FDA exclusivity term could provide
a total exclusivity period longer than the current twenty year patent term. 170 This
could generate additional revenue for late filers that obtain patents. With filing
later, there is the inherent gamble that while one is investing sums in clinical trials
for a product, the rights to the future product are uncertain. There is the risk that
someone else is going to file on the same or equivalent subject matter first and then a
party developing the product that does not file for patent protection may infringe the
filing party's patent and expose the non-filing company to liability. Alternatively, the
non-filing company may be forced to infringe, pay a royalty license, or pay a larger
fee to purchase a patent. Filing early makes it more likely no one else will get the
rights to a product first and one will not have to choose between not entering the
market, entering and risking infringement, or trying to negotiate a license or
purchase from the patent owner.
Another interesting comparison, aside from the order of the start date of the
respective exclusivity terms and chronological position of the overlap, is the
independent economic value that each type of exclusivity provides. For example, an
FDA exclusivity period can stand alone and generate independent economic value if a
patent is not granted. 171 If the FDA exclusivity period is interpreted as data
exclusivity, this would restrict the market by making barriers to entry steeper. 1 72
For example, costs to entry would be higher because any company seeking to have its
product approved sooner (before twelve year exclusivity period of pioneer reference
product expires) would have to incur the expense of its own clinical trials to produce
its own data rather than relying on the data of others. FDA market exclusivity
164 See generally Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-Based Open Science, 59
ME. L. REV. 339 (2007) (asserting that rights granted by patent law serve as a stimulus for
innovation which reaches underserved markets).
165 See id. at 356-68.

166 See generally Morgan, supra note 109 (standing for the proposition that market exclusivity
would allow the FDA to adopt rules that would promote research).
167 Id.
168 See Strunk, supra note 115; Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93, 96-97 (2004).
169 See Kuhlik, supra note 168, at 96-97.
170Id.

171 See Morgan, supra note 109, at 98 (demonstrating that marketing approval is by obtaining
FDA approval and not a patent).
172 See id.
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would provide even greater independent economic value. On the other hand, a
patent term that protects a product requiring FDA approval prior to marketing is
virtually worthless standing alone without FDA approval. 1 73 If a patent was granted
to protect a therapeutic biologic but the biologic cannot gain FDA approval, then it
cannot enter the market and the patent's value substantially disappears because the
right to exclude others from that which one cannot do has little value compared to
the right to exclude others from that which one can do; the former prevents others
from getting ahead but does not move one forward, while the latter moves one
forward while also preventing others from catching up. 1 74

B. Is Patent Protection Still Needed?

There has been some debate in late 2010 and early 2011 on the interpretation of
the twelve year exclusivity period set out in the BPCIA.175 More specifically, whether
the twelve year period is for data exclusivity or market exclusivity is at issue. As
mentioned, many initially believed the twelve year exclusivity period afforded by the
BPCIA was for data exclusivity. 176 Data exclusivity would mean that no biosimilar
producer could rely on the data already submitted in the reference product sponsor's
application for twelve years, measured from "the date on which the reference product
was first licensed." 177 A limitation of data exclusivity is that it does not prevent
biosimilar producers from collecting their own data to cover their proposed biosimilar
products. 178 A second comer can collect and submit its own independent data to
support an independently filed biologics license application ("BLA") and, in the
absence of patent protection, if the FDA approves there is nothing the pioneer
manufacturer can do to preclude the second comer from competing in the
marketplace. 1 79 Many generic manufacturers are considering this option of collecting
their own data and filing a traditional BLA as a way to circumvent any new
procedure implemented based on the BPCIA if such new procedures become unduly
restrictive, burdensome, or risky.
Despite their classification as "generic
manufacturers, many second comer companies have some trade secrets and
intellectual property of their own that they would not want to disclose to innovators
as required by the BPCIA to the extent that manufacturing processes are critical for
evaluation of the characteristics of the biologic product and for evaluation of patent
infringement. 180 If the FDA provided market exclusivity instead of data exclusivity
for pioneer biologics this would solve the problem of innovators without patent
protection being unable to stop biosimilar producers from generating their own data
or replicating data to get their own products to market sooner. 181 More recently, it
§ 355 (2006) (explaining new drugs cannot be marketed without approval).
Id
175See Strunk, supra note 115.
176 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(2), (k)(7) (West 2011).
177See id. §262(k)(7)(A).
178 See id.
179See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
L. REV. 345, 360 (2007).
180 See infra Part IB.
181 See Morgan, supra note 109; see infra Part III.
173See 21 U.S.C.
174
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appears the FDA is characterizing the twelve year exclusivity period referred to in
the BPCIA as marketing exclusivity. 1 82 It seems generic producers would generally
support this interpretation because the alternative is that if the twelve year period
applied to data exclusivity, the effective marketing exclusivity period would be much
longer because Applicants would not be able to submit their subsection (k)
applications using the innovators' data until the expiration of twelve years. 183 Then,
Applicants would have to wait longer for a response from the FDA, the typical back
and forth of prosecution, submitting additional materials, and finally, approval.
While this debate is not yet settled, as there are no implementing regulations or
draft guidances for the biosimilar approval pathway made available by the BPCIA, it
appears that the likely interpretation will be that the Act provides twelve years of
marketing exclusivity with four years of effective data exclusivity in the wait-to-file
period. If generic producers are able to rely on innovator data after four years, then
they can submit their applications early for review, so that by the time marketing
exclusivity of the innovator biologic ends eight years later, their biosimilar products
can be immediately or soon thereafter approved under subsection (k).

1. Disadvantagesof FDA Exclusivuty Without Patent Protection
Without patent protection it is doubtful that enough information will be publicly
available for academics and skilled scientists, researchers and engineers to utilize. 184
This lack of publicly available information will hinder progress and result in
economic waste as multiple parties spend money pursuing the same aims and
efforts. 185 Without the possibility of an economically valuable patent and the chance
for a limited term monopoly, inventors and their employers have no incentive to
disclose the intimate details of their technologies and it will be economically
advantageous and logical to instead keep this information confidential as trade
secrets. 186
Applications for FDA approval do not require of applicants the same burden as
applications for a patent. Applications for a patent require
a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
182See Approval Pathway for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological Products, 75 Fed. Reg.
61,497, 61,498, 61,500 (Oct. 2010) (public hearing and request for comments); Kurt Karst, Tussle
over BPCIA "Market"Versus 'Data" Exclusivity Continues, This Time the Generic Supporters Chime
In, FDA LAW BLOG (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fdalaw-blog-hyman-phelps/
2011/01/tussle-over-bpcia-market-versus-data-exclusivity-continues-this-time-the-generics-sidechimes-in.html.
183See Karst, supra note 182 (discussing the arguments from numerous generic drug
manufacturers such as Hospira, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Hospira, Mylan Labs, Teva
Pharmaceuticals, and Watson Pharmaceuticals).
184See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 206 (1987).
185 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification,
86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 263 (1998).
186 See David Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 61, 6263 (1991).
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enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 187
FDA applications are concerned with the safety and effectiveness of a finished
product on humans as opposed to how a product is made, why it works, and which
method or version is most preferable (unless the process of creating the product
affects safety and effectiveness). 188
Another point of distinction is that patent applications are published after
eighteen months from the earliest priority date claimed regardless of whether the
patent is granted and often before a patent is granted (given the long wait time for
responses from the PTO). 1 89 For published applications that never result in a
corresponding patent the material disclosed is forever donated to the public domain
and free for all to access. 190 Today, most publications on cutting edge research are
not free to the public but available only for purchase through a journal or online news
and database service. 191 In addition, FDA applications are generally treated as
confidential, unless the information has been previously disclosed, until the product
is approved, licensed, or cleared. 1 92 The public does not currently benefit from the
early disclosure of information in confidential FDA applications for products not yet
approved. 193 If policies were changed, however, the public could benefit from early
disclosure of information in confidential FDA applications, especially if there is not a
corresponding published patent application to cover the product.
Mandatory
disclosure in published patent applications allows everyone to benefit, at least
intellectually if not economically (until expiration of the patent term), from a
research team's findings. 1 94 More specifically, in the biologics context, published
patent applications allow other innovators and biosimilar producers to research what
is known about a biologic (how it is made, manner of use, test data, etc.

. .

. as

published in the patent application) to serve as an impetus and starting point for
determining other mechanisms of treatment and/or other potential biologics for
treatment or precursors for further research. 1 95
Pre-grant or pre-approval
publication is especially important when there is a long wait time between the filing
date of an application and patent grant or FDA approval. Otherwise, companies and
their investors do not have any idea how many other teams are working on the same
thing at the same time and they may be wasting time or duplicating research that

See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.5(d)(5)(iv) (2010).
189 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1).
190 MPEP, supra note 141, § 1.14(a)(1)(iii).
191 See YOCHAI BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS:
How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 323-24 (2006).
192 21 C.F.R. §§ 601.50-.51.
193 See id. § 601.51.
194 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-95 (2003).
195 See id. at 295 (describing how competitors may use the publicly disclosed information in the
patent application to "invent around" the invention and find new ways to achieve the same results).
187
188
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has already been performed by someone else but is not yet publicly available. 1 96
Even with publication at eighteen months there is an eighteen month unknown
waiting period or blackout during which patent applicant innovators do not know
what other applications have been submitted to the PTO. 1 97 There is always the
chance that an innovator may realize, the day after filing an expensive application,
that a competitor filed an application seventeen months and twenty-nine days earlier
disclosing the same or similar technology, which would render the innovator's patent
application redundant.
The absence of publicly available pending FDA applications may soon change as
part of President Obama's Open Government Initiative. 1 98 The FDA launched its
own Transparency Initiative in June 2009 and in May 2010.199 This transparency
Task Force released a report containing twenty-one draft proposals that would
significantly expand the disclosure of industry information by the FDA. 200 This
increased openness would be another way that the public could benefit from sharing
public knowledge; however, the innovator could risk exposure of valuable trade
secrets or patentable subject matter as a consequence.
Accordingly, any
implantation of transparency at the FDA may make it more imperative to file for
patent protection prior to FDA applications becoming publicly accessible.
It has been argued that without patent protection, academics and researchers
would be motivated to publish and share information for personal recognition and the
greater good of the scientific community. 201 To the extent these endeavors are funded
by commercial interests, the author of this paper believes it is more likely that
without patents significant advancements will be safeguarded as trade secrets.
Many academic researchers are required to sign confidentiality and non-disclosure
agreements with the Technology Transfer Offices of their universities and with the
companies funding their projects. 202 Publication of independent articles covering
technology within the scope of such agreements for personal prestige and/or the
greater good would be considered a breach of contract and may have serious
repercussions, including potential lawsuits for money damages or against the

196 FED. TRADE COMM'N,

To PROMOTE INNOVATION:
AND
POLICY
(Oct.

THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION

2003),
available
at
http:II
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
197See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
198Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009)
(memorandum from President Obama to the heads of executive departments and agencies).
199Transparency Initiative: Improving Transparency to Regulated Industry, 76 Fed. Reg.
1180, 1181 (Jan. 7, 2011).
200 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, FDA, Transparency Initiative:
Draft Proposals for Public Comment Regarding Disclosure Policies of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (May 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucm212528.htm.
201 Stephen M. Maurer, Promoting and Disseminating Knowledge:
The Public/Private
Interface,
8
(Sept.
2002),
http://gspp.berkeley.edu/iths/MaurerPrivatePublicInterface.pdf
(symposium paper prepared for the U.S. Nat'l Res. Council).
202 See, e.g., Mutual Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement, CHILLINGEFFECTS.ORG,
http://www.chillingeffects.org/tradesecret/resource.cgi?ResourcelD=89 (last visited Mar. 25, 2011)
(providing an example of a typical non-disclosure agreement); Non-Disclosure Agreement, UNIV. OF
TEX. SYS. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, http://www.utsystem.edu/og/intellectualproperty/contract/
confid.htm (last modified Mar. 13, 2007).
AND

PATENT

LAW
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university employer, actions to enjoin further research or commercialization, or
discharge from a university.
Additionally, a patent term is twenty years from the filing date and the FDA
exclusivity period afforded by the BPCIA is twelve years from the date of market
approval.2 03 The effective term of patent protection to cover different aspects of some
products can be extended by filing continuation and continuation-in-part (follow-up)
applications on improvements such that a single product, or upgraded versions
thereof, is covered by more than one patent.204 In products that take a long time to
achieve market approval after a patent is granted, the end dates for patent and FDA
protection might be equal. In many cases, however, a patent term will be longer than
the FDA exclusivity period and even a few extra months of a patent monopoly can
add up to serious financial returns from selling the protected product directly or
through licensing royalty streams. 205
Many commentators are satisfied with the apparent compromise in a data
exclusivity term of twelve years. 206 Data exclusivity protects the clinical trial data
that innovators submit in order to gain approval for their drugs, so others cannot
access or rely on that data in their own applications during the data exclusivity
period. 207 Empirical studies, however, show that twelve years may not be enough
time for innovator companies to regain investments. 208 If companies cannot regain
initial investments, the twelve years of exclusivity might actually reduce the number
of innovator biologics available to consumers. 209 This reduction would be due to: (1)
innovator companies not having the capital necessary to reinvest in other biologics in
their product pipelines; (2) investors not seeing adequate returns on their biotech
investments and therefore choosing to support other more predictable industries
instead; and (3) innovator companies not being able to attract new investors. 210
More recently, it seems the BPCIA will be interpreted and implemented to
provide for twelve years of marketing exclusivity and four years of data exclusivity
(wait-to-file period). If twelve years of data exclusivity is not likely to be long enough
to allow innovators to recoup investments twelve years of marketing exclusivity will
be even less likely to allow innovators to recoup investments. This is due to the fact
that a data exclusivity period of twelve years would effectively provide a longer
marketing exclusivity period if biosimilar producers do not circumvent the biosimilar
approval procedure by generating their own data to apply for a traditional BLA. For
example, if biosimilar producers cannot access and rely on innovator data from BLAs
in their subsection (k) applications until twelve years after the reference product is
licensed, then their subsection (k) application cannot be submitted before the
203 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006); 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(k)(7)(A) (West 2011).
204 See 37 C.F.R. §§1.53(b), 1.54(a)(2) (2010).
205 See Frangoise Simon, Market Access for Biopharmaceuticals: New Challenges, 25 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 1363, 1367 (2006) (noting that Epogen sales in 2005 alone were $2.5 billion).
206 See Carver, supra note 67, at 724-25.
207 David E. Adelman and Christopher M. Holman, Misplaced Fears in the Legislative Battle
Over Affordable Biotech Drugs, 50 IDEA 565, 569 (2010).
208 Letter from Henry Grabowski to the FTC, Re: Emerging Health Care Issues-Follow-On

Biologic Drug Competition Comment on Final Report 1, 12 (July 6, 2009), available at
econ.duke.edu/~grabow/FDS/FullFTC response.pdf.
209 Id. at 10, 13, 15.
2
10 Id. at9910, 13, 15.
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expiration of twelve years and will not be approved until some later period,
effectively providing a longer exclusivity period to innovators. In contrast, if generic
producers can access, rely on, and incorporate innovator data in their applications
sooner, and then submit their subsection (k) applications prior to the expiration of
twelve years of marketing exclusivity, by the time the twelve years is up their
applications are more likely to be immediately ready for approval.
Some commentators, such as Maxwell Morgan, argue that the biosimilars
pathway might curtail patenting of innovations. 211 Morgan argues that instead of
costly patents, innovators could use the guaranteed FDA market exclusivity period
as an adequate incentive for bringing biologics to market. 2 12
This theory
substantially underestimates the necessity of patent rights, both domestically and
internationally. 21 3
The net benefit of patents is positive to society and the innovator company, even
though there are some downsides. 214
For example, one potential negative
consequence to society may occur if a company receives a patent on a biologic,
thereby excluding all others from producing the biologic, but does not or cannot
successfully complete the FDA approval process.
If another company has the
resources to successfully bring the biologic to consumers but is blocked by the first
company's patent rights, the result would negatively affect society. Without the first
company's patent, the second company could have provided a valuable drug to the
market. 21 5 Luckily, this negative result would only be temporary because the second
company could start the FDA approval process once the patent expires. 216
Alternatively, and more likely, the second company could request a patent license
from the innovator company and then use its resources to complete the costly FDA
approval process. 217 Alternatively, if the innovator company is unable to obtain or
abandons a patent on the biologic after the application is published, the information
is donated to the public domain for the benefit of all.218
If a company secures patent protection in another country, it can keep others
from producing or importing a biologic into that country. 219 If the innovator company
only has FDA exclusivity in the United States, it cannot keep others from making,

211See Morgan, supra note 109, at 94.
2 2

1

Id.

213 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 194, at 294-95 (noting that patent rights are necessary
to protect inventors from copying by competitors, especially important in a field where there is often
simultaneous
discovery).
2 4

1 Id.
215 See, e.g., FDA Position on Allowing Patients with ALS Access to Iplex under an IND, FDA,

http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/HealthProfessionals/ucm118121.htm
(last visited Mar.
25, 2011).
216 See Richard E. Caves, Michael D. Whinston & Mark A. Hurwitz, Patent Expiration, Entry,
and Competition in the US PharmaceuticalIndustry, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY,
MICROECON 1, 36-37 (1991).
217 Donald 0. Beers, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS:
A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL
REQUIREMENTS, app. 34 at 42-43 (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed. 2004).
218 See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
219 See Richard H. Shear & Thomas E. Kelley, A Researcher's Guide to Patents, 132 PLANT
PHYSIOLOGY 1127, 1128 (2003).
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using, selling, or importing the biologic in foreign countries. 220 Thus, patents are
essential for international protection in today's global economy. 221 FDA exclusivity
would certainly not act as an "adequate surrogate" 222 for patent protection.
Innovator companies should continue to aggressively seek patent protection in order
to protect their substantial investments. Relying solely on FDA exclusivity would be
devastating for the innovator companies and for U.S. consumers.

2. Incentives Without Patent Protection
While the author of this paper does not recommend FDA exclusivity alone
without adequate patent protection due to the disadvantages discussed above, we
nonetheless admit that FDA exclusivities are valuable because they provide an
additional independent incentive to innovate. If the patent system fails to grant a
patent on a product that required substantial investment, but the product is FDA
approved, then the FDA exclusivity grant can be of tremendous importance. 223 A
floor of safety with an upside to the duration of monopoly (enhanced profitability) if a
patent is granted provides the confidence investors need to loosen their purse
strings. 224 Without a patent system there would still be incentives to develop
biologics so long as FDA exclusivity is provided and/or biologics' composition and the
process of making biologics are maintained as trade secrets. 225 With the reduced
disclosure of information (in the absence of published patent applications), however,
one discovery will not lead to others as quickly and the momentum of innovation will
not escalate as it otherwise would under the patent system.226 The problem with a
patent system alone is that it is somewhat arbitrary and unpredictable with the ever
present risk factor that a would-be infringing competitor will dig up some prior art
that invalidates the patent. 227 Another problem and benefit of the patent system is
that applications are generally published (absent a non-publication request) even if
the patent is not granted. 228 This is a problem for the patent applicant and a benefit
to society at large, including competitors. Pre-grant publication prevents changing
strategies during patent prosecution to instead rely on trade secret protection.2 29
Thus, a product that fails to obtain a patent is most likely not eligible for trade secret
protection. 230 This leaves the product unprotected and open to copycat competitors,
despite the investment required to develop the product. In contrast, until the FDA
220 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)(1) (2006) (limiting the
jurisdiction to "any State or Territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico").
221See Shear, supra note 219, at 1128.
222 COnraT Morgan, supra note 109, at 94.
223 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product Development, 257 SCI. 903, 906 (1992).
224 Id
225 See David R. Hannah, Should I Keep a Secret? The Effects of Trade Secret Protection
Procedures on Employees' Obligations to Protect Trade Secrets, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI. 71, 72-73
(2005).
226 See Morgan supra note 109, at 97-98.
227 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
228 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1).
229 See Hannah, supra note 225, at 72.
230 Id.
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system becomes transparent or requires publication, a product for which an FDA
application is filed may still be eligible for trade secret protection.
Even if a patent is not granted after publication of the patent application, the
published application does offer some advantages even to the would-be patentee. The
published application can be cited as prior art against patent applications of others
(including competitors) and thereby has defensive properties that prevent others
from patenting the material disclosed even if the patent applicant cannot get a
patent on the claims as written.
Without patents, there will be an incentive to get products approved quickly
under the FDA, if such approval is the only way to achieve exclusivity and
protection.231 Such products will likely be conservative rather than pushing the
limits. 232 Moreover, clinical trials required to demonstrate safety and effectiveness
are costly. 233 Without a long patent term to recoup investments, such products are
likely to piggyback on earlier clinical trials or require less costly trials. For example,
it takes up to an estimated $1.2 billion to develop the average biologic. 234 Then, the
innovator can expect to spend another $250-$450 million to create the
manufacturing facility needed to produce the precise biologic. 235 All of this expense is
incurred before the biologic makes any profit. Furthermore, only about a handful of
the biologics making it to the manufacturing stage and are introduced into the
market, are truly successful. 236
An FDA exclusivity period alone is unlikely to justify the investment needed to
pursue costly yet potentially revolutionary biologics. A longer patent term is needed
to provide a more extreme reward for the risk involved. 237 A guaranteed FDA
exclusivity period may provide a break-even point to recoup investment for many
products, but it is unlikely to provide the timeframe necessary to achieve the extreme
profitability that incentivizes undertaking development of the most risky, costly, and
potentially revolutionary biologic therapies.

C. Shortcomings of Current Patent Procedure and Room for Improvements
While the patent system provides substantial incentives to innovate, it is not
without its problems. Several improvements in the patent system could improve its
functioning and more fairly award limited monopoly power to reward innovation and
encourage financial investments in critical industries.

231See Morgan, supra note 109, at 105-06.
232 Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century
World's Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214, 1214 (2005).
233 See Sander, Genomic Medicine and the Future of Health Care, 287 SCI. 1977, 1978 (2000);
Joseph Palca, AIDS Drug Trials Enter New Age, 246 SC. 19, 19 (1989).
234 See Pipes, supra note 19.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 547, 610 (D. Del.
1997) (citing 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 20.03[3] [b] [ix]).
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1. Problem: PTO Delays Beyond the Restorative Power of Hatch- Waxman
One of the problems with the current patent system is that the twenty year
patent term frequently has an effective life of much less than that. 238 This
discrepancy results from a backlog at the PTO that creates a significant wait time
before a first response and then sometimes delays in responding to subsequent
correspondence. 239 Additionally, the part of a patent term that starts before the FDA
has approved a product has reduced value compared to patent term value after a
product protected by it is approved to market.
Various statutory provisions have been made in an attempt to compensate for
these issues. One type of patent term adjustment, called extension, which accounts
for delays with PTO during patent prosecution, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 154.
Section 154 provides time added back onto a term when the PTO fails to provide
initial notifications, subsequent responses, or to issue a patent within certain time
periods.240

Filing early in anticipation of a lengthy approval process is not enough, as the
backlog at the PTO is quite long. 24 1 The wait time until a first substantive response,
the First Action on the Merits varies depending upon art unit, but in some cases can
be five years. 242 If delayed prosecution impinges on a patent term it can be restored
through the Hatch-Waxman Act, but restoration is not always complete in that it is
limited in duration and does not always account for the full length of the delay
caused by PTO backlog and slow response time. 243
Another type of patent term adjustment, called a restoration, was provided by
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 244 The Hatch-Waxman Act added a section to the Patent
Act creating a term extension for patents on products that are subject to the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 245 The new provision created an extension for patents
that were not marketable on account of delayed approval.246 Further, Congress
expanded the list of products eligible for term restoration to include animal drugs
and veterinary biological products. 247
The new § 156 sets out various criteria for any patent extension under the
Hatch-Waxman Act. 248 Under these criteria, the product must have been "subject to

238 See Benjamin N. Roin, UnpatentableDrugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 503, 568 (2010).
239 See Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office's Troubled
Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2058 (2009).
240 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
241 See Rai, supra note 239, at 2058.
242 MPEP, supra note 141, § 704.11(b); see also RIO IP PTO Working Group, BIOTECH. INDUS.
ORG., http://www.bio.org/ip/ptocomm.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) (discussing instances of a five
year wait time).
243 See Merck v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
244 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
245 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4).
246 Id. § 156(a)(5).
247 Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-670, § 201,
102 Stat. 3971 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)).
248 35 U.S.C. § 156(a).
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a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use." 249 Second, the
Act allows only one restoration period. 250 If a first drug is granted an extension, then
a second drug, if similar to the first, will not be granted an extension. 251 Third, the
applicant must request the extension within sixty days of agency approval.252 The
PTO calculates the restoration period using the regulatory review period, generally
limited to the testing and approval phases, as the basis for a patent term
adjustment. 253 Any time an applicant does not reply or perform with diligence, the
length of the regulatory review period is reduced. 254 The restoration period cannot
exceed five years and the total length of the patent term cannot be longer than
fourteen years following agency approval.255
A third party may challenge the term extension once the FDA has published its
findings. 256 A party has 180 days from publication of the findings to file a due
diligence petition, questioning whether the applicant performed the required duties
within the appropriate timeframes. 257 The restoration period is claim specific and
extends only to products covered by the specific claims. 258

2. Independence of Patent Term and Development Time
Another issue with the current U.S. patent system is that the patent term of the
exclusivity period is uniform for all inventions and thus independent of the time and
cost to develop different types of inventions. 259 The patent term is also independent
of the commercial life of a product covered by the patent. 260 Some inventions are
quick to develop and gain approval, and are on the market quickly to earn enough
revenue to cover the investment costs (and financially justify their development)
within the first few months on the market. 261 Other products take decades to
develop, more years to get approved, and take decades or more of sales to become
profitable. 262 Given these variations from one invention to another makes it
reasonable to conclude that although the current system for determining patent term
is relatively easy to administer (at least without taking excessive adjustments into
account) it may not be the most economically efficient system.2 63 A more variable
Id. § 156(a)(4).
Id. § 156(a)(2).
251 Id. § 156(a)(1); see Terry G. Mahn, Striking the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug
Price Competition: UnderstandingThe Hatch-Waxman Act, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 245, 247 (1999).
252 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1).
253 MPEP, supra note 141, § 2758.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
249
250

2 57 Id.
258
259

35 U.S.C. § 156(b)(1) (2006).
See Amir H. Khoury, Differential Patent Terms and Commercial Capacity of Innovation, 18

TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 373, 388 (2010).
260 Id. at 397-98.
261
262
263

Id. at 394-95.
See Grabowski et al., supra note 6, at 1300.
See Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH

TECH. L.J. 269, 282-85 (2006).
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invention-dependent system would better reward innovation and investment without
excessively tying up of the competitive marketplace with patent landmines.

a. Patent Term is Uniform for All Patents, Measured from Filing Date
Currently a patent term for a U.S. utility patent is twenty years from the date
the application is filed with adjustments as necessary to account for PTO and
regulatory delays. 264

b. Some Products Are Ready to Market when the Patent Is Granted, Other Products
Require Additional Steps
For some inventions a product is ready to be marketed commercially as soon as
the patent is granted. For other inventions, several regulatory prerequisites must be
met before the product can be marketed and the patent can be exploited. 265 Thus, a
portion of a patent term is essentially wasted for some patents because the products
that are covered by them cannot be marketed during the entire patent term.
It would make more sense from an investment perspective to have the patent
term measured from the earliest date at which both the patent was granted and the
product covered by the patent was approved to market in the country where the
patent was granted.
Another factor that could be factored into patent term
determination for economic efficiency would be the amount of investment required to
arrive at the patentable product or a related metric, the amount of time required on
the market to recoup investment (which would depend on amount of investment and
market price).

V. CONCLUSION

The passage of biosimilar legislation provides hope to retain a robust
biotechnology industry in the United States and to protect investors while
encouraging innovators. While FDA exclusivity alone is insufficient to encourage
and protect innovation and investment in the United States, longer FDA exclusivity
times, including the twelve year period for biologics specified in the recently passed
BPCIA, should help to encourage investment in biologics. The FDA exclusivity
period alone will not be long enough to recoup all of the investment required to
develop and obtain approval for many biologics and other inventions, however, it does
provide some level of guaranteed exclusivity while awaiting a response from the PTO
regarding patentability. This independent exclusivity should encourage companies to
get their FDA applications moving forward earlier and for products that are
approved it will reduce potential economic loss thereby supporting investment.
The exclusivity that an FDA application provides is clearly not enough to
maintain and increase our current rate of biotechnology innovation. The limited
§ 154(a)-(b) (2006).
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).

264 35 U.S.C.
265

[10:553 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

582

monopoly term for patents, together with the ability to adjust this term as needed to
fairly compensate an applicant for PTO and FDA delays, will still be necessary to
ensure highly specialized and resource intensive biologics get developed.
The
detailed disclosure required of patent applicants is also an important aspect of the
patent system. Most importantly, the detailed disclosure is published because
individual inventors and companies will likely not share such detailed information if
they are not required to or if there is not a potential benefit in the form of a limited
monopoly (the rights to exclude others during the patent term). Although difficult
and potentially impractical to implement, an interesting future approach might be to
more closely correlate the patent term to begin on the date of FDA market approval
and to last a period which would depend on the development cost and profitability of
the invention. The aim would be to allow profitability such that it justifies the
development cost and rewards the risk taken, thereby encouraging further
development investments. While it is difficult to strike a perfect balance, innovators,
biosimilar companies, and the public all benefit most from innovator biologics having
strong patent protection coupled with long FDA exclusivity periods.

